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requested. A writ of mandamus cannot be granted unless the party
seeking it shows a clear legal right to the remedy. State ex rel. Browning v. Haden, 175 S.E.2d 197 (W. Va. 1970).
No cases were found discussing a state official's duty to spend
his entire allocations, but the decision appears to be in accord with
the restrictions upon a writ of mandamus. Such a writ will lie to
compel one to exercise any discretion he is permitted, but not to
control the result of that exercise. Miller v. County Court of Tucker
County, 34 W. Va. 285, 12 S.E. 702 (1890). Futhermore, mandamus is the correct procedure to require payment of an order
approved by a public body; but it cannot be used to demand
remuneration of the original obligation. Town of Elizabeth v.
County Court of Wirt County, 128 W. Va. 34, 35 S.E.2d 601
(1945).
Mandamus-Eminent Domain
Pursuant to a highway improvement contract with the State
Road Commission, a construction company was engaged in excavating portions of a hillside for improvement to a state highway. During
the work, an abandoned mine tunnel was opened. Several hours
later, large volumes of water gushed from the tunnel, flooded a nearby town, and damaged realty belonging to petitioners. Petitioners
brought a mandamus suit to compel the State Road Commissioner
to institute an eminent domain proceeding to ascertain the damage.
Held; Writs awarded. When highway construction or improvement
results in property damage to non-residual, private property in
the absence of an actual taking, the State Road Commissioner
has a duty to institute eminent domain proceedings within a reasonable time to ascertain damages. Moreover, mandamus will lie to
compel the observance of this duty. State ex rel. Phoenix Insurance
Co. v. Ritchie, 175 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1970). The court stated
that W. VA. CONST. art. I, § 9, which provides that property shall
not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation,
is not limited to residual property. The clear legal right which a
petitioner must show is not that he had been damaged, but that
there is reasonable cause to believe that the issue of damages should
be resolved by a judge and jury. Possible negligence of the State
in causing the damage is not a bar to recovery in eminent domain
proceedings.
Judge Berry's dissent urged that the eminent domain proceeding
applied only to residual property and did not extend to negligent
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damage, which was properly the subject of a separate action. The
dissent of Judge Calhoun stated the constitution limited eminent
domain compensation to land taken (or damaged) only for public
use; and since the land was not damaged pursuant to the public
use, recovery in eminent domain was barred. The dissent further
stated liability in this case should have been based on negligence;
and therefore, the Court of Claims was the proper avenue of
recovery.
This case is in accord with the trend of West Virginia decisions
which have awarded mandamus to compel eminent domain proceedings involving damage to non-residual property. The facts of
this case were similar to those in State ex rel. Lynch v. State Road
Commissioner, 151 W. Va. 858, 157 S.E.2d 329 (1967), which
unanimously reached the same result.
Torts-Application of Last Chance Doctrine
Plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile driven by the
defendant when it was involved in a collision with a second automobile. Plaintiff instituted an action for the recovery of damages
for injuries sustained in the accident. The Circuit Court of Monongalia County directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the
question of liability. On appeal the defendant contended that, while
she was negligent, the driver of the second automobile had the last
clear chance to avoid the collision, and that the plaintiff's cause
of action, if any, was against the other driver and not against the
defendant. Held, affirmed. The defendant's assertion of the last clear
chance doctrine was improper and no error was committed in
directing the verdict for the plaintiff. Edwards v. Lynch, 175 S.E.2d
632 (W. Va. 1970).
It is generally recognized that the doctrine of last clear chance
arises only when the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence.
The doctrine cannot be invoked between defendants who were
concurrently negligent except in Pennsylvania. See 65A C.J.S.
Negligence § 136(1) at 124-25 (1966). The court in Edwards,
citing Greene v. Charlotte Chemical Laboratories, Inc., 254 N.C.
680, 120 S.E.2d 82 (1961), stated that "[a] defendant may not
rely upon the doctrine by asserting the negligence of a joint tortfeasor who has not been sued by the plaintiff." (emphasis added).
This statement was apparently phrased to conform to the factual
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